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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(f), Utah Code Ann. (1992).

This

is an appeal from final judgment, dated May 28, 1992, of the
Sixth Judicial District Court for Sanpete County, State of Utah.
Notice of Appeal was filed June 4, 1992.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
ISSUE I
DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO
CONSIDER THE DEFENDANT'S HISTORY, CHARACTER AND
REHABILITATIVE NEEDS WHEN IT ENTERED JUDGMENT SENTENCING THE
DEFENDANT TO NINE CONSECUTIVE TERMS OF NOT LESS THAN ONE OR
MORE THAN FIFTEEN YEARS IN THE UTAH STATE PRISON?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Upon conviction of a crime, whether by verdict or by plea,
the matter of sentencing rests within the discretion of the trial
court, within the limits prescribed by law.

An appellate court

may reverse or modify a sentence which is prescribed by law if it
is clearly excessive or if the trial court abused its discretion.
State v. Jolivet, 712 P.2d 843, 844 (Utah 1986); State v.
Gerrard. 584 P.2d 885, 887-88 (Utah 1978); State v. Harris. 585
P.2d 450, 453 (Utah 1978).
ISSUE II
IS THE SENTENCE CLEARLY EXCESSIVE CONSIDERING THE GRAVITY
AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE OFFENSES AND THE HISTORY,
CHARACTER, AND REHABILITATIVE NEEDS OF THE DEFENDANT?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Upon conviction of a crime, whether by verdict or by plea,
4

the matter of sentencing rests within the discretion of the trial
court, within the limits prescribed by law.

An appellate court

may reverse or modify a sentence which is prescribed by law if it
is clearly excessive or if the trial court abused its discretion.
State v. Jolivet. 712 P.2d 843, 844 (Utah 1986); State v.
Gerrard. 584 P.2d 885, 887-88 (Utah 1978); State v. Harris, 585
P.2d 451, 453 (Utah 1978).
STATUTES TO BE INTERPRETED
Utah Code Annotated
Section 76-3-401.
Limitations.

Concurrent or consecutive sentences -

(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been
adjudged guilty of more than one felony offense, whether to
impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for the offenses.
Sentences for state offenses shall run concurrently unless the
court states in the sentence that they shall run consecutively.
(2) A court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of
the offenses and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs
of the defendant in determining whether to impose consecutive
sentences.
(3) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses
arising out of a single criminal episode as defined in Section
76-1-401.
(4) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate
maximum of all sentences imposed may not exceed 3 0 years 7
imprisonment. However, this limitation does not apply if an
offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the death
penalty or a maximum sentence of life imprisonment.
(5) The limitation in Subsection (4) applies if a defendant:
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one
offense;
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more
offenses, all of which were committed prior to imposition of
sentence for any one or more of them; or
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state
other than the present sentencing court or by a court of
another state or federal jurisdiction.
(6) In determining the effect of consecutive sentences and
the manner in which they shall be served, the Board of Pardons
shall treat the defendant as though he has been committed for a
single term that shall consist of the aggregate of the validly
imposed prison terms as follows:
5

(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 3 0-year
limitation the maximum sentence is considered to be 30
years; and
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the
minimum term, if any, constitutes the aggregate of the
validly imposed minimum terms,
(7) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to
run concurrently with the other or with a sentence presently
being served, the lesser sentence shall merge into the greater
and the greater shall be the term to be served. If the sentences
are equal and concurrent, they shall merge into one sentence with
the most recent conviction constituting the time to be served.
(8) This section may not be construed to restrict the number
or length of individual sentences that may be imposed or to
affect the validity of any sentence so imposed, but only to limit
the length of sentences actually served under the commitments.
(9) This section may not be construed to limit the authority
of a court to impose consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Case No. 920360-CA

vs.
DENNIS WAYNE SHUFFLER,
Defendant-Appellant,

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the final judgment of the Sixth
Judicial District Court for Sanpete County, State of Utah.

The

defendant, Dennis Wayne Shuffler, plead guilty to six counts of
unlawful dealing with property by a fiduciary, Utah Code Ann. §
76-6-513 (1990 Repl.), and three counts of diverting or
appropriating insurance funds, Utah Code Ann. § 31A-23-310(6)
(1990 Repl.).

All nine counts were second degree felonies.

A

sentencing hearing was held April 29, 1992. (Transcript of
Sentencing Proceeding, hereinafter "Tr.", at 40).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
At the sentencing hearing the trial court sentenced the
defendant to serve a term of one to fifteen years on each of the
nine counts and ordered that the terms be served consecutively.
(Judgment, hereinafter "J.", at 1 ) . The court also ordered the
defendant to pay full restitution to all victims and imposed a
7

fine of ten thousand dollars on each count, the fine to be
suspended on successful payment of full victim restitution.

(J.

at 2) •
The court further ordered the revocation of any licenses
issued to the defendant by the state of Utah to act as an
insurance agent or broker or any licenses which permit the
defendant to act in a fiduciary capacity.

The court required

that, during the term of the defendant's parole, the defendant
not be allowed to act in a fiduciary capacity on behalf of any
individual or corporation or act in any capacity which requires
him to have control or possession of another person's money or
property.

(J. at 2).

8

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FAILING TO CONSIDER
THE DEFENDANT'S HISTORY, CHARACTER AND REHABILITATIVE NEEDS WHEN
IT ENTERED JUDGMENT SENTENCING THE DEFENDANT TO NINE CONSECUTIVE
TERMS OF NOT LESS THAN ONE NOR MORE THAN FIFTEEN YEARS IN THE
UTAH STATE PRISON.
Statute mandates that a trial court consider the history,
character and rehabilitative needs of the defendant in
determining whether to impose consecutive sentences.

The trial

court failed to consider these factors and made no findings in
the record concerning the defendant's history, character or
rehabilitative needs.

The trial court abused its discretion

because it imposed consecutive sentences without considering the
factors mandated by statute.

II, THE SENTENCE IS CLEARLY EXCESSIVE CONSIDERING THE GRAVITY AND
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE OFFENSES AND THE HISTORY, CHARACTER, AND
REHABILITATIVE NEEDS OF THE DEFENDANT.
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that a sentence which is
within the limits prescribed by law may be reversed or modified
if it is clearly excessive or if the trial court abused its
discretion.

An extraordinarily long sentence, even though within

the limits set by statute, must be justified by evidence in the
record or it will be overturned.

The court must consider the

rehabilitative needs of the defendant along with the seriousness
of the crime and the need to protect the public.
The defendant in the case at bar is a prime candidate for
rehabilitation.

He is well educated, has no criminal record, and

fully cooperated with the state in the investigation of the
9

crime.

The crimes for which he was convicted involved no

violence and the public safety does not require that the
defendant, a non-violent criminal, be confined.

The public can

be fully protected by other provisions of the sentence.

The

sentence imposed in this case was the maximum possible sentence
and it is not justified by the evidence in the record.

10

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FAILING TO CONSIDER THE
DEFENDANT'S HISTORY, CHARACTER AND REHABILITATIVE NEEDS WHEN IT
ENTERED JUDGMENT SENTENCING THE DEFENDANT TO NINE CONSECUTIVE
TERMS OF NOT LESS THAN ONE NOR MORE THAN FIFTEEN YEARS IN THE
UTAH STATE PRISON.
The trial court abusea its discretion by imposing on the
defendant a sentence of nine consecutive terms of not less than
one nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.

In a

case such as this, where the defendant has been convicted of more
than one felony offense, the trial court must determine whether
to impose consecutive sentences for the offenses.

Sentences run

concurrently unless the trial court determines that they should
run consecutively.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1) (1992).

statute mandates that

ff

The

[a] court shall consider the gravity and

circumstances of the offenses and the history, character, and
rehabilitative needs of the defendant in determining whether to
impose consecutive sentences."
added).

Id. at § 76-3-401(2)(emphasis

The trial court ignored this mandate when it sentenced

Mr. Shuffler to nine consecutive terms, which, in the words of
the court, is the "maximum penalty".

(Tr. at 41).

There is nothing in the transcript of the sentencing hearing
nor in the court's written order which indicates that the trial
court considered the factors mandated by statute.

The basis for

the trial court's determination that the sentences should run
consecutively rather than concurrently seems to have been the
11

court's conclusion that Mr. Shuffler is not a trustworthy person.
The court stated, M[f]rom what I have seen in the* presentence
report and what I had heard from you today leads me to conclude
that you are not a trustworthy person." (Tr. at 41). The court
continued,

lf

[s]o for that reason . . .

I intend to impose the

maximum penalty against you and I do do that." (Tr. at 42).
Admittedly, the crimes committed by Mr. Shuffler are
serious.

In addition to the seriousness of the crimes, however,

the court is required to consider the circumstances of the crimes
and the history, character and rehabilitative needs of the
defendant in fashioning an appropriate sentence.
§ 76-3-401(2).

Utah Code Ann.

A finding that the defendant is not trustworthy

is not sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the statute.
It is impossible to divine the basis for the trial court's
decision unless the court makes specific findings, either orally
or in writing, which explain and justify that decision.

The

record in this case is void of any findings made by the trial
court as to the history and rehabilitative needs of the
defendant.

Absent such findings, it cannot be assumed that the

trial court made its sentencing determination based on these
statutorily mandated factors.

The trial court abused its

discretion by imposing consecutive terms
these factors.

without considering

Therefore, the sentence should be overturned or

modified.
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POINT II
THE SENTENCE IS CLEARLY EXCESSIVE CONSIDERING THE GRAVITY AND
CIRCUMSTANCES OP THE OFFENSES AND THE HISTORY, CHARACTER, AND
REHABILITATIVE NEEDS OF THE DEFENDANT.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that a sentence which is
within the limits prescribed by law may be reversed or modified
if it is clearly excessive or if the trial court abused its
discretion.

State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah

1978)(citing State v. Pickard, 105 Ariz. 219, 462 P.2d 87 (1969);
People v. Strong, 190 Colo. 189, 544 P.2d 966 (1976); State v.
Hawk, 97 Idaho 1, 539 P.2d 553 (1975)).

This is true even though

the matter of sentencing rests within the discretion of the trial
court. See State v. Jolivet, 712 P.2d 843, 844 (Utah 1986); State
v. Shelby, 728 P.2d 987, 988 (Utah 1986).
A similar rule is followed in other states.

The Idaho

Supreme Court has stated, "when this court has found that there
has been an abuse of discretion in sentencing, it has not
hesitated to exercise its power to review in that regard to
reduce the sentences imposed."

State v. Hawk, 97 Idaho 1, 539

P.2d 553 (1975). See, e.g., State v. Ledbetter, 83 Idaho 451, 364
P.2d 171 (1961)(thirty-year sentence for lewd and lascivious
conduct reduced to fifteen years); State v. Weise, 75 Idaho 404,
273 P.2d 97 (1954) (maximum term of imprisonment and fine for
involuntary manslaughter found to be excessive); State v.
Linebarger, 71 Idaho 255, 232 P.2d 669 (1951)(twenty-year
sentence for rape reduced to a term not to exceed five years).
Arizona courts have also held that a sentence which is
13

appropriate under the applicable statute will be revised if it
clearly appears to be excessive.

See, e.g., State v. Fierro, 101

Ariz. 118, 416 P.2d 551 (1966)(sentence for robbery held to be
excessive considering the defendant's youth and rehabilitative
needs).
Mr. Shuffler plead-guilty to nine second degree felonies
each of which are punishable by an indeterminate term of not less
than one year nor more than 15 years.
203(2) (1990 Repl.).

See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-

Although the sentence is within the limits

prescribed by law, it is excessive and an abuse of the trial
court's discretion when evaluated in light of the circumstances
of the crime and the history and rehabilitative needs of the
defendant.
Mr. Shuffler's case can be compared to People v. Strong, 190
Colo. 189, 544 P.2d 966 (1976). In that case the defendant plead
guilty to robbery and was sentenced to the maximum allowable
term.

Appellate review of his sentence was guided by Colorado

law which, like the Utah Statute, required the court to consider
the nature of the offense and the possibility of rehabilitating
the defendant and also required the court to "attempt to work out
a fair accommodation between the need to protect society at large
and to deter potential offenders, to punish the convicted
offender, and to rehabilitate him".

Id^f at 967.

The Colorado

Supreme Court also required that "[a]ny imposition of the maximum
or close to the maximum penalty must be supported by sound
reasons in the record for . . . x a sentence that is too long tends
14

to reinforce the criminal tendencies of the convicted
defendant.,lf

Id. at 967-68 (quoting People v. Duran, 188 Colo.

207, 533 P.2d 1116, 1119 (1975).
The defendant in Strong had a minimal level of education and
had held no steady job.

He had a prior conviction for burglary

and there was evidence that he was a drug addict.

On the other

hand, the offense involved no aggravating circumstances and the
defendant's record did not demonstrate involvement with violent
crimes nor would it support the conclusion that he was a hardened
criminal without hope for rehabilitation.

The court concluded

that the sentence was excessive and must be reduced because
11

[w]hile being punished, appellant's opportunities for

rehabilitation will be enhanced by a reduction in the sentence
imposed, and this . . . may be accomplished here without eroding
the underlying societal need, that of protecting the public
interest."

Id., at 968.

Similarly, Mr. Shuffler's opportunities for rehabilitation
will be enhanced by a reduction in the sentence imposed.

In fact

he is a more likely candidate for rehabilitation than the
defendant in Strong.

Unlike the defendant in Strong, Mr.

Shuffler is well educated and has been steadily employed.

(Tr.

at 8 ) . Like the defendant in Strong, Mr. Shuffler has had no
involvement with violent crimes.

A review of Mr. Shuffler's

record shows that he has no previous felony or misdemeanor
convictions; he is not a hardened criminal without hope for
rehabilitation.

Mr. Shuffler is a prime candidate for
15

rehabilitation based on his education and past record.
It is also important"to note that Mr. Shuffler's sentence
could be reduced while still protecting the public interest.
Public safety does not require that Mr. Shuffler, a nonviolent
criminal, be confined.

The public is adequately protected by the

provisions of the sentence which revoked his insurance licenses
and prohibited him from acting in a fiduciary capacity. (See, J.
at 2).

There are no sound reasons in the record which support

the imposition of the maximum penalty.
The case at bar can also be compared to People v. Edwards,
198 Colo. 52, 598 P.2d 126 (1979).

In Edwards, the defendant was

convicted of three felony counts of selling drugs.

The trial

court sentenced him to ten to fourteen years on each count, the
sentences on the first two counts to run concurrently and the
third count to run consecutively.

On appeal the state supreme

court emphasized that "[a]lthough sentencing is a discretionary
function of a trial judge, a consecutive sentence resulting in an
extraordinarily long prison term must be supported by evidence in
the record justifying the trial judge's action."

Id., at 129.

Review of sentencing must take into account the purposes of
criminal sanction including deterrence, rehabilitation and
punishment and the statutory mandate to consider

the nature of

the offense, the character of the offender and the public
interest.

Id.

In Edwards, the forty-two year old defendant had no felony
convictions and no misdemeanor convictions within the five years
16

immediately preceding the charges.

He had dropped out of high

school but completed his high school education and earned one
year of college credit while in the United States Air Force.

The

court concluded, considering the seriousness of the crime, that
the sentences were not so severe as to amount to an abuse of
discretion.

The court also concluded, however, that there was no

support in the record for the trial court to require the third
sentence to be served consecutively.

This conclusion was based

on the fact that the defendant had never engaged in violent
conduct or threatened to inflict bodily injury on anyone and the
fact that the trial judge had expressly stated that the
defendant's rehabilitation was of no concern.

Id. at 130.

In the case at bar, as in Edwards, there is no support in
the record for the trial court to require that the sentences on
all nine counts be served consecutively.

There is no evidence

which justifies the extraordinarily long sentence.

Mr.

Shuffler's crimes were not violent and they did not involve
threat of bodily harm.

In addition, the trial court failed to

consider Mr. Shuffler's past record and rehabilitative needs when
it imposed the consecutive sentences and abused its discretion by
failing to make findings as to these factors.

The excessive

sentences which resulted from this abuse of discretion should be
overturned.
The case at bar is different from State v. Lee, 656 P.2d 443
(Utah 1982), where the Utah Supreme Court considered a challenge
to a consecutive sentence.

The defendant in Lee was convicted
17

for aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and aggravated
assault. The trial court determined that the three sentences
should run consecutively rather than concurrently.

On appeal the

defendant contended that the sentencing court did not apply the
guidelines found in section 76-3-401(2) of the Utah Code.

This

section, as set forth above, requires the court to consider the
gravity and circumstances of the

offenses and the history,

character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant. Utah Code
Ann. § 76-3-401(2) (1992):

The Utah Supreme Court found the

consecutive sentences fully justified under the statute.

Id., at

444.
The defendant in Lee was apprehended after a violent crime
spree in which he stole three different cars, took a hostage at
gunpoint, breached a roadblock, shot one police officer and fired
at several others.

As to the defendant's character and

rehabilitative possibilities, the Adult Probation Report
contained a "history of chronic [and] continuous offenses." Id.
Mr. Lee's sentence was fully justified, considering the gravity
and circumstances of the

offenses and the history, character,

and rehabilitative needs of the defendant.

Id.

The circumstances surrounding Mr. Shuffler's crimes, as well
as his character and history, make the case at bar very different
from Lee.

Mr. Shuffler's education and work history show that he

has great rehabilitative possibilities.

The record shows that

Mr. Shuffler was very cooperative with the attorney general's
office during the investigation of the case.

18

At the sentencing

hearing the prosecutor noted how helpful Mr. Shuffler had been
and commented, "I haven't had this kind of cooperation in the
past from a defendant."

(Tr. at 5.)

A long sentence may sometimes be justified by the depravity
of the crime for which the defendant has been convicted or where
the defendant's past record reveals repeated convictions such
that the public safety can only be assured if the offender is
confined.

The need for a maximum sentence is clear where a

hardened criminal commits a vicious crime.
967.

Strong, 544 P.2d at

There is no evidence in the record which justifies the

extraordinarily long sentence imposed on Mr. Shuffler.

CONCLUSION
The trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider
the defendant's history character and rehabilitative needs.

The

sentence imposed is clearly excessive and should be reversed or
modified.

Respectfully submitted,

Paul R. Frisctiknecht
Attorney for Appellant
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SANPETB COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

J U D G M E N T
Criminal No. 921600021

vs.
DENNIS WAYNE SHUFFLER,

Judge David L. Mower

Defendant.

The above-captioned matter came on for Sentencing on
the 29th day of April, 1992, the Defendant having previously
entered pleas of guilty to nine (9) second degree felonies. The
Court having read the presentence report; having heard the
statements of Robert C. Lunnen for the State of Utah, Paul R.
Frischknecht, Attorney for Defendant, and the statement of
Defendant, Dennis Wayne Shuffler; and being aware of no further
impediment to entry of Judgment;
NOW THEREFORE, for the above criminal offenses, all of
which are second degree felonies, the Defendant is sentenced to
serve a term of one (1) to fifteen (15) years on each of the nine
(9) counts charged in the Information, and that all nine counts

5GMENT ENTERED
DGMENT DOCKET

?

If
P«fA

-5"

shall be served consecutively.

Defendant shall pay .full

restitution to all victims, including, but not limited to those
victims listed in the Statement of Defendant, which has been
executed and filed into the court record. Defendant shall pay a
fine of ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00) on each count charged.
The Court will suspend the fine upon successful payment of full
victim restitution.
XT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any insurance licenses held
by the Defendant, which have been issued by the State of Utah to
act as an insurance agent or broker, or any licenses issued by
the State which permit Defendant to act in a fiduciary capacity,
are hereby revoked.
XT 18 FURTHER ORDERED that during the term of
Defendant's parole, he shall not act in a fiduciary capacity on
behalf of any individual or corporation, nor shall he act in any
capacity which requires him to have the control or possession of
another persons money or property.
DATED this

•2-1 _ day of

fllttf

, 1992.

Dav^i^KL. Mower
District Court Judge
day of

APPROVED as to form for presentment and fJWLing this
1992.

vkaj'L.<=*£tx^t,JL,j.j

Panl R. Frisptlk&echt

Lticfrnex £or defendant

Robert C. Lunnen
Assistant Attorney General
* /

PAGE 40
l would do the same thing.

And I have tackled with this thing

2

for six months and it's now time for action.

3

anxious to get on with it.

4

respect you for whatever decision you would come up with, so

5

that's basically it,

Let's get it done.

And I

COURT ORDER

6
7

And I'm just

THE COURT:

Okay.

Mr. Shuffler is here because

8

he's convicted of nine second degree felonies.

Six of them

9

are unlawful dealing with property by a fiduciary, and three

10

of them are diversion of appropriation of insurance funds.

11

There's no minimum time required for any of those.

12

maximum fine that could be imposed is $10,000, plus a 25

13

percent surcharge, which was the surcharge in effect for at

14

least part of the time.

15

the 25 percent surcharge, but I think I'm gonna take care of

16

that by not imposing it just so we don't have any problems

17

*dth that.

18

The

I'm not sure how many started with

As to the unlawful dealing with property by a

19

fiduciary, Mr. Shuffler, you're sentenced to serve 1 to 15

20

years in the Utah State,Prison for each of those offenses,

1\

six counts. That's six sentences to the Utah Stat© Prison,

22

1 to 15 yuars;

23

Diversion of appropriation of insurance funds,

24

you «,. -entenced to serve 1 to 15 years in the Utah State

25

prison for earh of those counts.

That's three second degree
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felonies.
MR. SHUFFLER:
THE COURT:
$10,000 on each count.

Um-hm.

You're also ordered to pay a line or
The fine will include.any

that was in effect at the time the offenses were

surcharge
committed:

You're ordered to pay restitution to each of the
victims in this case; and that means any victim, whether
8II named in one of the nine counts or not.

I do not, at this

9

point, determine the amount of restitution because I'm not

io

in possession of sufficient evidence to determine the amount

u

of restitution.

12

I am required to make a decision about the

13

sentences and whether they run consecutively or

14

concurrently.

13

Shuffler.

,6

I do impose the maximum penalty, as I can.

17

explain to you the reason why I do that, for your benefit

18

The sentences will run consecutively, M r .

I am intending to impose the maximum penalty and
And I want to

II and for the benefit of the victims.

19

From what I have seen in the presentence report

20

and what I have heard from you today leads m e to conclude

2i

thai, you are not a trustworthy person.

22

binds a community together is the belief that w e all have

23

that we can trust each other and that most people will be

24

obedient, and you violated that trust on behalf of these

25

people who are here today.

And the glue that
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1

And what you've told me about your bankruptcy

2

proceedings concerns me because you're telling m e that you

3

have not been honest with the Bankruptcy Court.

4

required to do that in order to get a surcharge from the

5

Bankruptcy Court and your comments lead m e to believe that

And you're

6 II you're still not a trustworthy person, in spite of what's
7

happened to you so far.

So for that reason, I'm intending

8

t o — I intend to impose the maximum penalty against you and I

9

do do that.

io

opportunity for. older victims to ever receive any

n

restitution from you, and when I'm faced with the choice

I recognize that that does not give a lot of

12 between how to get money out of you and how to get
13 punishment out of you, I suppose I choose the punishment
u

because not only did you take m o n e y — m o n e y can be replaced,

15 but trust can't be replaced, and I think that's the big
16 violation that you made was the violation of trust that
171| people, had in you.
18

The Board of Pardons will have authority over you

l?

<o decide not only how much time you spend in prison, but

20

tlw amount of restitution.

21

COIIUU-..!

22

The Board of Pardons will

a restitution hearing.
Mr. Lunnen, I need to make sure,that the Board of

23

PurJons knows the names and addresses of each of the

24

victims.

2$

in the,.order that I sign, the commitment order or the

T don't know whether that information ought to be

PAGE 43
1

judgment, because then that information may get wider

2

circulation than it ought to get.

3

needs to know that information.

4

that?

5
6
7

MR. LUNNEN:

But the Board of Pardons

What do you suggest about

Your Honor, I believe the Board of

Pardons will have access to the presentence report.
THE COURT:

But I—but I'm just seeing names on

8

the presentence report.

9

I know the Board of Pardons sends letters to the victims.

10
11
12

MR. LUNNEN:

T don't know that I saw addresses.

AP&P does also have all the names and

addresses of all the victims.
THE COURT:

I know the Board of Pardons sends

13

letters to victims, prior to each parole hearing, prior to

14

restitution hearings.

15

MR. LUNNEN:

16

THE COURT:

Yes, they do.
But of course, they can't do that if

17

they don't have the information.

18

for them to have the information.

19

MR. LUNNEN:

It's—so it's important

What we'll do is we'll make sure that

20

AP&P gives all the names and addresses of the victims to the

21

Boaju* of Pardons for their use.

22

Mr. Murray in the nature that they give that information to

23

Lho Board of Pardons.

24
25

THE COURT:

I'll contact Mr. Mullin and

I need you to include in the order,

Mr. Lunnen, language that I request that the Board of
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1

Pardons, in fashioning any parole order for Mr. Shuffler,

2

that they impose as a condition of parole that he not be

3

allowed to be licensed u/ith any kind of a license that

4

allows him to act as a fiduciary or to handle other people's

5

money.
I also want to do one other thing, which I hope

6
7

will be helpful to the cause of restitution and that's this.

8

If restitution can be paid within the period of parole, then

9

that restitution money will count as full payment of fines

10

and restitutions so the fines will be suspended if the

11

restitution is paid.
T give you that incentive, Mr. Shuffler, to try

12
13

and get the restitution paid.

14

$10,000—so you can save that much money by paying

15

institution within the period of parole.

16

incentive.

17

seem to have high confidence, and if you do, wonderful.

18

h>»l'8 you gut it done.
MR. SHUFFLER:

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. SHUFFLER:

22

THE COURT:

24
25

me wrong.

It may be small

I don't know how you're gonna do it, but you

19

23

I fined you $90,000—9 times

What shall I do?

Yqu can't give up.

I

Just give up?
It's true.

Just remember, I told you so.

And I'd be delighted to have you prove

I would just be delighted.
MR. SHUFFLER:

we'll work at it.

I would be delighted to do it, so
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THE COURT:

I hope you can.

And maybe what I'm

doing, maybe the way I'm speaking is in the nature of
throwing down the gauntlet for you, to say, "Okay.
wrong.

Prove me

See what you can do."
MR. SHUFFLER:

Well, it's up to me anyway, Your

Honor.
THE COURT:

I'd be delighted to,have you prove me

wrong.
Mr. Lunnen what else should we do that we haven't
done today?
MR. LUNNEN:
Your Honor.

I think we've covered everything,

I'll draft an order for your review and I'll

also send a copy to Mr. Frischknecht.
THE COURT:

What we need quickly is a commitment

order and you probably don't have a form that you could fill
out right now.
MR. LUNNEN:
THE COURT:

No.

I do not.

But the Sheriff is gonna want a

commitment order as his authority to transport Mr. Shuffler.
Can you g*t with the Coqnty Attorney's office while you're
here and while I'm here and at least get ,a commitment order
done before the day is out?
MR. LUNNEN:
THE COURT:

I will.
It will be very short of just saying

that you should commit him to the custody of the Sheriff and
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1

the Department of Corrections for nine consecutive 1 to

2

15-year terms.

3 II
4

Mr. Frischknecht, what else can you think of that
we should do today that w e haven't done?

5 ||

MR. FRISCHKNRCHT:

Your Honor, would the Court

6 II consider, in light of that sentence, that he have a day or
7

two to take care of some things he needs to d o that he

81| ccviously won't be able to do for a long time?
9

THE COURT:

io |l

MR. LUNNEN:

n

Mr. Lunnen, any reaction to that?
Your Honor, I have to be truthful in

saying that Mr.Shuffler has appeared for all his court

12 appearances.

I can't say that he's been reluctant to be

13

here or has tried to run.

He's been here in the community

14

years and years and years and has stayed here during this

15 whole ordeal, and so I really have no basis to object.

I'm

16 || a little cautious for M r . Shuffler's safety.
17

THE COURT:

Is he on his recognizance now?

18

MR. LUNNEN:

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. LUNNEN:

21

THE COURT:

Why are you worried about his safety?

22

MR. LUNNEN:

I think the reality o f this case is

Yes.

He is.

No bond posted.
No bond.

23

Ll.« reality that he is sentenced to nine consecutive terms

24

is tJi^t certainly it's gonna have a negative mental

25

PX ' w l o g i c a l impact upon M r . Shuffler.

I'm worried about
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76-3-401

or affected by the conviction, by advertising in designated areas, or by designated media or otherwise.
(2) When an executive or high managerial officer of a corporation or association is convicted of an offense committed in furtherance of the affairs of the
corporation or association, the court may include in the sentence an order
disqualifying him from exercising similar functions in the same or other corporations or associations for a period of not exceeding five years if it finds the
scope or willfulness of his illegal actions make it dangerous or inadvisable for
such functions to be entrusted to him.
History; C. 1953, 76-3-303, enacted by L.
1973. oh. 196, i 76-3-303.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Kev Numbers. — Criminal Law +• 1206(1).

PART 4
LIMITATIONS AND SPECIAL PROVISIONS ON
SENTENCES
76-3-401. Concurrent or consecutive sentences — Limitations.
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more
than1 one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for the offenses. Sentences for state offenses shall run concurrently
unless the court states in the sentence that they shall run consecutively.
(2) A court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and
the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant in determin*
ing whether to impose consecutive sentences.
(3) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a
single criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401.
^ (4) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of all
Sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years1 imprisonment. However, this
limitation does not apply if an offense for which the defendant is sentenced
authorizes the death penalty or a maximum sentence of life imprisonment.
(5) The limitation in Subsection (4) applies if a defendant:
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense;
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which
were committed prior to imposition of sentence for any one or more of
them; or
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the
present sentencing court or by a court of another state or federal jurisdiction.
(6), In determining the effect or consecutive sentences and the manner in
which they shall be served, the Board of Pardons shall treat the defendant as
though he has been committed for a single term that shall consist of the
aggregate of the validly imposed prison terms as follows:
67
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(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation the
maximum sentence is considered to b£ 30 years; and
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum
term, if any, constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum
terms.
(7) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrently with the other or with a sentence presently being served, the lesser
sentence shall merge into the greater and the greater shall be the term to be
served. If the sentences are equal and concurrent, they shall merge into one
sentence with the most recent conviction constituting the time to be served.
(8) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of
individual consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity
of any sentence so imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually
served under the commitments.
(9) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to
impose consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases.
History: C. 1953, 76-3-401, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-401; 1974, ch. 32, § 7;
1969, ch. 181, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amendment, effective April 24,1989, deleted "Subject
to the limitations of Subsections (2) through
(5)" at the beginning of Subsection (1); inserted
"for state offenses" in the second sentence in
Subsection (1); rewrote the first sentence in
Subsection (4) which read "If a court lawfully
determined to impose consecutive sentences,
the aggregate minimum of all sentences imposed may not exceed twelve years' imprisonment and the aggregate maximum of all sen-

tence imposed may not exceed thirty years'
imprisonment"; inserted "a maximum sentence
of before "life imprisonment" at the end of the
second sentence in Subsection (4); rewrote Subsection (6) following "single term" which read
"witft the following incidents, (a) The prison
term shall consist of the aggregate of the validly imposed prison terms; and (b) The minitauKV t»rra> if any> ah&ll catxatitute tbe aggregate of the validly imposed minimum terms";
added Subsections (8) and (9); and made numerous stylistic changes throughout the section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
and after the sexual assault, in which the victim was restrained against her will and subCommencement of second sentence,
jected to a substantial risk of harm from the
Consecutive sentences.
defendant's threats and loaded gun. State v.
Sentences imposed by different states.
Joiivet, 712 P.2d 843 (Utah 1986). |
Trial court did not err in imposing four conCommencement of second sentence.
secutive sentences for second-degree murder,
Sentence upon conviction of second offense attempted murder and two counts of aggracould not begin later than termination of first; vated assault arising out of a barroom altercacourt properly sentenced defendant to serve ad- tion, because defendant committed four sepaditional five years on conviction of perjury, to rate and distinct crimes involving different viccommence upon expiration of life sentence tims- State v. Mane, 783 P.2d 61 (Ct. App.
which defendant was already serving. State v. 1989).
Dodge, 19 Utah 2d 44, 425 P.2d 781 (1967).
Sentences imposed by different states.
Consecutive sentences.
Subsection (1), providing that sentences are
The court did not err in imposing consecutive to run concurrently unless the court states to
sentences on the defendant for the crimes of the contrary in the sentence, does not apply to
aggravated kidnapping and sexual assault, sentences imposed by two different sovereigns,
even though both were committed in the course and, therefore, such sentences should run conof a single criminal episode, where the evi- secutively unless the sentencing court exdence clearly showed that a sufficiently sub- pressly directs otherwise. State v. Reed, 709
stantial period of time had elapsed, both before P,2d 391 (Utah 1985).
ANALYSIS
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